This study empirically analyzes the effect of board characteristics on real earnings management, which is measured by using three proxies including abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal discretionary expenses, and abnormal production costs. Specifically, we will investigate how board independence (or board size) affects real earnings management. Additionally, we will investigate the relation between the board characteristics and real earnings management according to before K-IFRS mandatory adoption or after K-IFRS mandatory adoption.
INTRODUCTION
sing hand-collected data on the firm's board of directors from 2009 to 2014, we examine the relation between the board characteristics and real earnings management. The final sample size is 2,565 firmyear observations for this study. Specifically, we will investigate how board independence (or board size) affects real earnings management. Additionally, we will investigate the relation between the board characteristics and real earnings management according to before K-IFRS mandatory adoption or after K-IFRS mandatory adoption.
Managers have an incentive to adjust earnings for their own benefit while infringing upon the interests of shareholders. Prior studies show that managers have many incentives to manipulate opportunistically earnings (Sun & Liu, 2011) . Meanwhile, corporate governance plays a role as a device for solving information asymmetry and efficient allocation of economic resources to resolve the agency problem among various stakeholders (Shin & Lee, 2014; Kang & Ko, 2014; Oh, Shin & Hong, 2015; Oh & Shin, 2016) .
Independent directors who are outside the company must collect and process a significant amount of company-specific information in order to efficiently perform consulting and monitoring tasks (Armstrong, Core & Guay, 2014) . Also, because outside directors are a means of effectively controlling managers, they can effectively monitor managers in the process of financial reporting rather than internal directors (Sun & Liu, 2011) .
Based on prior literature, we analyze the association between the board characteristics and real earnings management. We use Roychowdhury (2006) ' method as real earnings management measure and also use the percentage of its outside directors (ratio of independent directors to board size), board size (number of directors on the board) as the board characteristics measure.
The empirical results of this study are as follows. First, the relation between board independence (board size) and the absolute value of abnormal cash flows from operations is statistically significant and positive (+). Second, the relation between board independence (board size) and the absolute value of abnormal production costs is statistically significant and positive (+). Third, the relation between board independence (board size) and the absolute value of abnormal discretionary expenses is statistically significant and positive (+). These findings present that the board independence (or board size) does not constrain real earnings management. Thus, these mean that board independence (or board size) does not work as a mechanism to reduce real earnings management.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section II shows prior literature and develops the research hypothesis. Section III presents the research design. Section IV reports the empirical results. Section V sets forth the conclusion.
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

Characteristics of the Board of Directors
Because outside directors are a means of effectively controlling managers, they can effectively monitor managers in the process of financial reporting rather than internal directors (Sun & Liu, 2011) . Jaggi, Leung and Gul (2009) also document that board independence may lessen earnings management.
Prior research shows conflicting evidence about the effect of board size on firm valuation. For example, Yermack (1996) shows a negative relation between board size and Tobin's q. However, Cheng (2008) finds larger board can reduce firm risk. Roychowdhury (2006) documents that managers manipulate operating-based earnings through sales manipulation, discretionary expenditures, and production cost.
Real Earnings Management
There is a association between the board characteristics and the abnormal discretionary expenses.
H 3-1 : There is a association between board independence and the abnormal discretionary expenses.
There is a association between board size and the abnormal discretionary expenses.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Regression Models
To test Hypothesis 1 -Hypothesis 3, we use a multivariate regression model to investigate whether board independence (or board size) constrains real earnings management as we have expected. Regression models are as follows; (Roychowdhury, 2006; Klein, 2002) . SIZE is added to control firm size effect and omitted variables effect (Francis, La Fond, Olsson & Schipper, 2005) . OWN is ownership. FOR is foreign ownership. We included OWN and FOR to control corporate goverance.
Measures of Real Earnings Management (Roychowdhury 2006)
In this study, real earnings management was measured by Roychowdhury (2006) . Expressed the following equation (2) - (4), Abnormal operating cash flow (AbOCF), abnormal production costs (AbPRD), and abnormal discretionary expenses (AbSGA) are the values obtained by subtracting normal operating cash flow, normal production costs, and normal discretionary expenses measured by Roychowdhury (2006) in actual operating cash flow, actual production costs, and actual discretionary expenses, respectively.
This means the residuals measured by the Roychowdhury (2006) . In this study, the absolute value of the residual is used to analyze the magnitude of real earnings management. Thus, the larger the absolute value of the residual, the greater the real earnings management. : the absolute value of abnormal production costs;
: the absolute value of abnormal discretionary expenses; : total assets at the beginning of year;
$% : residual.
Sample Selection
We employ the data collected from 2009 to 2014 from the Korean stock market. The sample selection process is summarized in Table 1 . We first eliminate the quoted non-financial December firms for which financial and stock data cannot be collected from FN-Guide. Those firms whose year-ends are not on December 31 are excluded because of data homogeneity. Financial firms are also eliminated since the nature of the business is different from our sample. The final sample for regression analyses is 2,565 firm-year observations. We winsorized each of the variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to minimize the effect of outliers except dummy variables. Panel A of Table 2 presents the distribution across fiscal years in our sample. Panel B of Table Table 4 shows Pearson correlations among regression variables. is significantly and positively (+) correlated with BOARDSIZE at 1%. This means bigger board size makes larger real earnings management using cash flow from operating activities.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Correlation Analysis
is significantly and positively (+) correlated with OUTBOARD and BOARDSIZE at 5% and 5%, respectively. This means higher board independence and bigger board size make larger real earnings management using production costs.
is significantly and positively (+) correlated with BOARDSIZE at 10%. This means bigger board size makes larger real earnings management using discretionary expenses. 2) ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed).
Multivariate Results
Using models (1), we perform a multivariate regression analysis to test whether board independence (board size) is associated with real earnings management. Table 5 presents the results from the regression model in equation (1) that predicts whether board independence (board size) is associated with . The coefficient (β * ) on OUTBOARD (BOARDSIZE) is significantly positive (+) at 5% (5%) with . Cosistent with our prediction, board independence (board size) does not costrain abnormal cash flows from operations. Table 6 shows the results from the regression model in equation (1) that predicts whether board independence (board size) is associated with . The coefficient (β * ) on OUTBOARD (BOARDSIZE) is significantly positive (+) at 1% (1%) with . Cosistent with our prediction, board independence (board size) does not costrain abnormal production costs. Table 7 shows the results from the regression model in equation (1) that predicts whether board independence (board size) is associated with . The coefficient (β * ) on OUTBOARD (BOARDSIZE) is significantly positive (+) at 1% (1%) with . Cosistent with our prediction, board independence (board size) does not costrain abnormal discretionary expenses. 2) ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). Cosistent with our prediction, board independence (board size) does not constrain abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary expenses in Post-IFRS sub-samples only. Table 3 for variable definitions. 2) ***,**, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed).
CONCLUSION
We empirically examine the association between the characteristics of the board of directors and real earnings management and then investigate the extent to which this association is affected by characteristics of the board of directors according to before or after Korea adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2011. Real earnings management is measured by Roychowdhury (2006) . Additionally, the characteristics of the board of directors is used by a board independence (the proportion of independent directors on the board) and board size.
